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Fiscal Sustainability in the \Vest African Moneta~y Zone: Emerging Issues
Emmanuel Ating Onwioduokif
Fiscal sustainability i11 u m,m<·lurr 11111011 is crili(' a/for se,·.,,·af reasons. Frscal pulicr 011/come has an
in/711c11 ce 0 11 uggreJ;ule d emand and lung-term i11t.:re.1·t rutl!S, irhich are 11.rnal~,· considered in the
f,m1111latio11 of111011etan.·p ul1c, · Th<' puper discusses tht' t/reorclicul isrnes in assessingfiscal sustainability
,md adopted an eclect1c approach lo measure s11stu111ah1hfl· in the Zone; th ejiscul und deht s11stai11ahi/11y
,,( Jl'.·L\/Z countries is examined hased un the fo/lm,·i11g i11d1cutors: priman· halunce, total debt GDP;
total d ebt service / domestic re,·e,we; tutu/ debt sen·ice' Hxpnrt; nel present value of total deht /Domestic
rn·c1111e; and net pres~11/ \'/Jluc uf tutu/ debt sen·ice ·Hxpur/s. The u11tcome of the anu~vsis suggests that
most 11 :-L\JZ countries un, 1101 fisca/~1 · sustainable there h,· bring lo the fore the need for fis cal
conso/1datiu11 measures to address 1he problem of s11stai11abilrty. The paper ident(fied the need for
f11rtlrer rax 1·,!jurms in th,• JU.\ {7. to focus 011 hroad/1·-has,·d raxl!s s11ch as I a/111! Added Jax (f ~4TJ. Taxes
011 wealth . i11c/11ding prop,•rty· tax. ,r/rich i.f a s,·.'ec/11·,· tax 011 real estate, capital le,·y, 1rhich is a
unce-and-fur-all /a.Yon wea/1l1 ; a11d tlr<' dom estic l"alt!. ll'hicl, is a lu.Y 011 the rental \"a/11e ufhousing, wert'
also identified as lik<'~\" In yidd higher revenu e.fol" the Ko1·emment. In ordt'r tu achieve fiscal stabilif\•
and owrall s11stai11abilifl• of goremmenl re,·e1111e, fis cal pulic1· design should aim al harnessing afl
di,-ecl and indirect tax revenue sources, especial~\' uxc,insl th e background of evid<'ncc !Ira/ most ~[4..\JZ
cmmlries ha,•e notful~v <'xploited thei,- taxable capacity II is desirable that tax administration should be
efficient, app~v simple and codified rules. ensure .fairness, a11J embody progress. Tax administration
axe11c1es need to bt' mud<' f,111ctio11al through employmt>11t of qualified personnel, staff training,
pronsion of equipment a11d n ecessan.-Jacilities and m ·erall conducive working em·ironment.

Kc~· Words: Fiscal sustainability: Debt and Debt Sustainability: Fiscal deficit: Re\'cnue
Consolidation: WAMZ
JEL Classification Numbers: P27, P2./: E62: 1~'63

I.

Introduction

Fiscal sustainability in a monetary union is critical for several reasons. Fiscal policy
outcome has an influence on aggregate demand and long-term interest rates, which are
usually considered in the formulation of monetary policy. Fiscal imbalances are
worrisome because they draw resources away from investment and, when deficits
persist, lead to build-up of government debt and a consequent servicing burden that can

0

M1: Onwioduokit is a staj/"uf the lli:sr Af1·ica11 ,\Jonetarv Institute. . lccra, Ghana

CH~ FU)~( l\llC

&:.

l-"1::\ ...\:--: CL\l 1n \·11 \\ \ ·i >I. J ~.

~u

become unsustainable and can threaten macroeconomic stability. Unsustamable fiscal
policy puts undue responsibility for maintaining stabilisation on monetary polic~· But
since monetary policy alone cannot compensate for the weakness of fiscal profligacy

in

a longer time period, it therefore means that unsustainable fiscal policy would clearly
undermine the credibility of macroeconomic stabilis.ition , making required monetary
policy harsher. Possible outcomes of such policy mi.x ha,·e been identified to include
high real interest rates due to the deficit borro\',,;ing requirements, with reduction of the
capital available to the growth-generating pri\·ate 111,·estments; high costs of financmg
the budget deficit (high interest rates, tight credit control), emergence of e"l:pend1ture
arrears, rising cost of public debt service; and falling competitiveness with large trade
deficit and accumulation of external debt In addition, aggregate demand and interest
rates have a direct impact on the balance sheet of financial intermediaries and, hence, on
the trnnsmission channels of monetary policy.
The prevalence of fiscal deficits could result

in

a non-cooperati,·e equilibrium ,

characterised by higher long-term interest rates. This can be illustrated by the example
of an individual member state willing to tolerate higher deficits and to issue more debt
securities in order to finance the resulting gap . This additional debt issuance would in all
likelihood give way to a crowding out effect, namely, an upward pressure on interest
rates due to the drain on private savings. The key point is that in a monetary union.
where there exists a single currency and a high degree of integration between nc1t1onal
financial markets. this additional burden \'-;ould be borne by the zone as a whole, and not
Just by the individual member state responsible for the additional debt issuance . This
kind of spill over effects could encourage eacli member state to issue excessive amounts
of debts . As a result, the area-wide interest rates would tend to be higher than dictated by
economic fundamentals . Such a situation could compliczite the conduct of monetary
policy

The relationship between monetary and fiscal policy runs both ways . A more
predictable fiscal policy fostered by fiscal rules ,vould produce a more stable
environment as regards, for instance, the inflation rate, aggregate demand or the ta.x
burden. Such an environment would be conducive for economic and financial stabilitv.
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which would enhance the efficiency of monetary policy. On the other hand, a more
predictable monetary policy is supportive of fiscal discipline. More predictable
short-term interest changes are indeed likely to impact on the budgetary equilibrium in
several member states. fn addition, a stable monetary policy able to anchor the inflation
expectations of economic agents will generate lower and less volatile long-term interest
rates, which will further dampen the risk of budgetary slippages, induced by unforeseen
interest rate developments.
More predictable interest rates are also extremely important for the general government,
even when public debt level is extremely low. The assets of the general government,
including the accumulated reserves of the investments and special fund and the assets
held by the general pension regime as well as the associated income is primarily
dependent on short and long-term interest rate developments. Indeed, the soundness and
profitability of the financial sector, which accounts for a significant portion of all taxes
collected by the government, could be sensitive to the level of short-term interest rates,
to the slope of the yield curve and also to stock exchange prices. However, a non
sustainable fiscal position is bound to create problems for the conduct of monetary policy
and for general macroeconomic stability. The absence of fiscal sustainability could
undermine the commitment of national governments to fiscal discipline.
A central issue in fiscal policy discussions is how to determine whether the net stock of
government financial liabi!tties is sustainable. A sustainable stock of debt is consistent
with the feasibility conditions set by current and future patterns of government revenue
and outlays. Hence, the aim of fiscal sustainability analysis is to determine whether the
government is living "within its means," and to indicate corrective policy measures for
situations in which the reverse is the case.
Like other developing countries, most West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 1
countries endured persistent budget deficits for several decades (Onwioduokit, 2003).
The continued deficits increased borrowing resulting in the accumulation of debt stocks.

1

rr:-L\/Z Co1111fries comprises, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, .\'igeria and Sren-a Leone.
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The goal of this paper is to present an assessment of the fiscal sustainability in the
WAMZ member countries. Accordingly, the remaining part of the paper is organised
thus; Part II dwells on theoretical/conceptual issues, while Part Ill examines WAMZ
countries' recent fiscal profile. The causes of unsustainable fiscal profiles of WAMZ
countries are examined in Part IV, while Part V contains policy recommendations/
conclusions.
II

Theoretical Background, Literature and Conceptual issues

Theoretical Background

The presentation in this segment dwells basically on two aspects: one on the relationship
between fiscal policy and inflation, which is the main focus of monetary policy and
fiscal sustainability issues.
On the theoretical front, there are two strands of academic debate regarding the
relationship between fiscal policy and inflation, notably the inflation tax literature and
the fiscal theory of the price level. The literature on fiscal theory of price level
distinguishes between monetary dominant and fiscally-dominant regimes. In the
monetary dominant regime fiscal primary surplus adjusts, given any sequence of prices,
to guarantee fiscal solvency, whereas in the fiscally dominant regime the government's
inter-temporal budget constraint is satisfied only for some price paths and the price level
is assumed to settle itself to a path satisfying the government budget constraint.
In the inflation-tax literature, connection between fiscal policy and inflation is studied
in a simple demand-for-and-supply-of-money framework Inflation is treated as a tax on
money balance3 and fiscal policy is connected with inflation through seigniorage
revenues obtained from increasing money supply. The cost of increased money supply is
borne by holders of money balances as the purchasing power of money decreases.
A considerable body of empirical evidence confirms that inflation is highly correlated
with money growth, the long-run correlation between these two variables being close to
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one. In high inflation countries, the connection between money growth and inflation is
broadly simultaneous. In low-inflation countries, the effects of money growth are
distributed rather evenly across the current and previous periods, and the short run
correlation between contemporaneous and even lagged money groVvth and inflation
appears to be rather low.
Regarding the relationship between public finances and money supply, a plausible and
often advanced hypothesis is that money supply and seigniorage income should increase
as a function of the fiscal needs, as reflected by the size of the budget deficit. However,
empirical evidence of this link is weak. The basic message of the inflation tax literature
for the analysis of fiscal soundness and monetary stability is that in some circumstances,
monetary financing may be the only source of finance available for the government and
that monetary financing is bound to affect the functioning of the monetary system.
There seems to be widespread conclusion that high inflation is almost always caused by
fiscal pressures. However, among other things, high inflation disrupts the budgeting of
expenditures and wrecks tax collection systems . Thus, government receipts and
disbursements are likely to vary erratically.
Another recent strand of literature on the fiscal theory of the price level, deals explicitly
with fiscal and monetary policy and their interactions. The theory focuses on the
government's inter-temporal budget constraint and the sustainability of the fiscal
position . There are many ways to state the government's inter-temporal budget
constraint. One useful way to write it is in terms of the change of the (net) debt ratio,

l1¾t =-s +(i-

g- p)b+e

... ... .. .............. ...... ...... ..... ... ... . (I)

Here b is the government's net debt and s primary surplus, both as per cent of GDP.
!J.b/ !J.t denote the change in the debt ratio whereas i is the (average) interest rate on
debt, g the growth rate of real GDP and p the rate of inflation. The stock-flow
adjustment term e captures, as per cent of GDP, all other effects on the change in the debt
ratio such as revaluations of debt items, etc.
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The fiscal theory of the price level assumes that agents optimise their behaviour over
time in anticipation of future economic developments, including the expectation of
future policy actions. There is also a shift of emphasis towards the analysis of budgetary
and monetary policy rules, rather than single decisions, and their time-consistency
The inter-temporal and optimising character of a!1alysis makes models complicated and
difficult to analyse, even given their strong simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, the
theory has made many interesting contributions to the analysis of fiscal soundness and
monetary stability, including the analysis of the institutional framework needed to
govern the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy mentioned earlier as an
example of a justification for fiscal convergence requirements.
Compared to the inflation tax literature, the fiscal theory of the price level extends both
the time perspective and the spectrum of Ii abilities and assets considered in the analysis.
Instead of a single immediate rate of inflation, the whole time path of the price level is
relevant, and instead of the stock of money, the whole portfolio of government liabilities
and assets is considered at least in principle.
Results from the theory illustrate the fact that irrespective of the starting position, the
burden of irresponsible fiscal policies, if followed persistently over time, becomes
excessive in the end even for strong stability oriented monetary policies. The risk of
vicious debt dynamics is rather explicit in equation (1). If primary budget deficit is large
(as reflected in a large negative value of s), debt tends to increase. When debt becomes
sufficiently large, it starts to grow at an accelerating rate, as nominal interest rate
normally exceeds nominal output growth. At this stage, there is not much to be done to
increase the real rate of growth (g) and there are also limits to feasible primary surpluses
(s). For very high debt ratios, unsustainable debt dynamics can only be reversed if the
rate of interest on debt (i) is low enough and the rate of inflation (p) is high enough, i.e.
through monetary financing. In rational expectation models, this is clearly perceived by
the public well ahead its actual occurrence.
Furthermore, models considered in the literature clearly illustrate the fact that monetary
and fiscal policies need to be consistent in order to be able to produce balanced and
harmonious policy outcomes. In fact, there is no guarantee in these models that a uniquely
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determined. well-behaving equilibrium time path for the price level exists, even for
policy rules which in themselves seem to be quite sensible but not mutually consistent.
For instance, inflationnry and deflationary spirals. stochastically fluctuating explosive
inflation or sunspot equilibrium may emerge even if monetary authorities let money
stock grov,: nt a constant rate or follow a Taylor rule.

Conceptual Issues and Lrterature Review
A simple indication of the sustainability of a country 's fiscal policy is provided by the
comparison of the actual primary balance (the government balance excluding interest
payments) with the primary balance that would be needed to stabilize the ratio of debt to
GDP at its current level. The difference is a measure of the additional fiscal efforts
needed to stabilize the debt. This depends on the level of debt, interest rate, and the
gro\vth rate of GDP, as well as on the actual primary balance. For a situation in which the
interest rate exceeds the grO\vth rate, a primary surplus \vould be needed to stabilize the
debt-to-GDP ratio. with a gro\',1h rate higher than the interest rate; the debt-to-GDP
ratio will fall without the need to run a primary surplus.
A country's policies are adjudged fiscally sustainable if they lead to a situation in which
the country can satisfy its budget constraint. HO\vcver, Mendoza (2003) noted that the
true budget constraint is an accounting identity that, by definition, is always satisfied. A
government, for instance, can decide to satisfy its budget constraint by not paying (via
outright default) or by inflating away its debt In this sense. any analysis of fiscal
sustainability ultimately reflects a value judgment on the costs and benefits of
alternative adjustment mechanisms. Consequently, standard sustainability analysis
utterly assumes that adjustments through the level and composition of tax revenues or
primary expenditure arc preferable to adjustments via default or inflation.
A set of fiscal policies is unsustainable if it leads to insolvency 1 (IMF, 2002 ; Croce and
Juan-Ramon, 2003). However, they suggested that solvency is only a necessary
1
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condition for sustainability because it could be achieved with very large and costly
future adjustments. Sustainability, instead, requires achie,mg soh·ency with unchanged
policies So, we can define a policy stance as sustainable if a horrmrer is CXJh'Cted lo he

ah/e lo co111i11u1: se1Tici11g its cl.:hl irit/10111 an 11111"1:a!isticu/~1· largefi1111re correction tu
!he halance ofincome and expc11cli111r.: (IMF, 2002).
With these considerations in mind, we define a sustainable situation as one that satisfies
the following two conditions
,

If a country can satisfy its current period budget constraint· without recurring to

•

default or excessive debt monetization; and
If a country does not keep accumulating debt by knowing that a major future

•

3

adjustment will be needed in order to sen·ice the debt

D

Wiren·

i

mcas11res rh,· .Hock of f'llblic dehr (111cas111nl al 1/Jc bcgi1111i11g of 1he period/.

is 1/re illtercst rnte paid

REV

br

gm·er11me111 debr.

G

M

is 1/rc 111011c1an· has,·,

is g01·crnme111 ex{'e11di111n· in goods and sc1Ti<·cs, and

represent:, taxation (1re1 of tmnsfcrs) and other ,.,,,.,,,111,·s (they could h,· ro_rnlticsfi'Ol1111at11ra/ ri·sor,,.,.es ).

Equurion I I) clcur/_Y shmn the// a gi1·en deficit ca11 be fl1w11C<'d ci1/Jcr b_,. iss11i11g debt (ho11dfi11a11cing) or /J\' printing
mane_,. /111011e_r financing) As excc.ui,·e 111011<·_1· financing mm· lcaJ to hyperi1rjlario11. eq11orio11 ( 1) is oj11•11 ll'ri1tc11

a;( 0

1+1 -

0 = jQ +G, - REV,. The eq11atin11 does not im{'ose a strong conslraim
1)

1

011

gol'l'm111cnts

that ure ahle to iss11r deb!. indeed. 1'in11a/ly Oil_\' pattern of d,'.f1ci1 would he .rnslainablc if it 11-ere po ssible 10 bnrrmr
money and pay tire imercs/ hy horre111·i11g morc. \\/[cox ( / 989 /
1

The inter-temporal constraint. instead. imposes a limit on the gm·crmuent's ability to borrow indefinitely. by
requiring net i111tial debt plus the present , ·alue of expected future gm·ernment expenditures to be equal to (or
not greater than) the present value of expected future government rc,·enues. This could be presented as:

E

1

(REVr+k)

.. ,... (3)

(1 + i)
\\'here

£ , Jen11tes c:1.peclation taken at lime t, and all Pliler ,·ariahlcs .ire as L',.uiicr delineJ

E,aluatmg c4uation < 21 require, fomllllaLing expectation, un Lhc futu re palh of go, L'nllllL'nL rn enucs anJ expenditure,.
Furthermore. lhe e4uation is highly .~rmpl,ried hy as,t11ning that the interest rate paid on government deht is rnn~tanl
anJ e 4 t1al Ill the di scount rate .
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One implication of equation (3) is that in the limit (as t goes to infinity), the present value
of debt in the terminal period should be zero. Thus

. D1+1 _0
LIi,m(1
~
+I.)1 -

....... ........ .. .... ................ .... .. .. .. ... ... .. .. .... 4

This condition is usually referred to as no Ponzi game condition or NPG. Since
sustainability requires that the abo ve conditions be satisfied without a radical change in
policies, sustainability can be tested by looking at whether the current fiscal stance will
eventually lead to a violation of equation (4).
As prescribed tests of sustainability tend to be tricky as well as very challenging in terms
of data requirement, some analysts have developed rule of thumb indicators aimed at
checking whether current policies can stabilize or reduce a given debt ratio . While these
indicators have the advantage of being simple, it should be recognized that they are not
based on any well-specified definition of sustainability.
The starting point for deriving these indicators is the current period budget constraint of
equation (2) that, after dividing all variables by GDP, can be re-written as :

11d =(r- g)d- ps ............................... ...................... s
Where d is the debt to GDP ratio , r the steady state real interest rate, g the long-run
growth rate of real GDP, and ps the primary surplus (defined as (REV-G)1GDP) .
A positive value of (5) indicates that debt to GDP is expanding and may be interpreted
as an unsustainable policy. After setting /1d equal to zero, equation 5 could be rewritten
as

ps = (r-g) d, and

ps is as, and ps is interpreted as the primary surplus required to

stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio for a given real interest rate, growth rate of the economy
and initial stock of debt. Given its simplicity, equation (5) is probably the most commonly
used indicator of sustainability.
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Blanchard (1990) defines a set of sustainability indicators that require computing the
constant tax rate that satisfies, ( = E ( e +( r- g)d) , where ( measures taxes over
GDP and e government expenditure over GDP This technique can be used to compute
short-run (where expectations are replaced with current values of e, r, and g) or,
depending on the length of the period for which expectations are taken, medium and
long-run indicators.
Blanchard ( 1990) indicated that f has an easy interpretation because it is equal to the
annuity value of expected future spending and transfers plus the difference between
expected r.eal interest rate and growth rate multiplied by the current debt-to-GDP ratio.
Then, if f is larger than the current tax rate (t ), an adjustment in spending or taxation
will be required and hence the fiscal policy stance would not be sustainable. The
sustainability indicator

( ( - t)

measures the size of the ~equired adjustment in the

current period. He proposed that different values of ( t- t) will have different
implications for sustainability depending on the starting level t. Countries with a low tax
rate may have more room to adjust, while countries that already have high tax levels or
limited ability to raise taxes (maybe because of the presence of a large informal sector,
as is the case in developing countries) may have to resort to debt monetization or
outright default
Mendoza and Oviedo (2003) developed probabilistic model for assessing fiscal
sustainability. The guiding principle of the Mendoza-Oviedo (MO) model is that of
"credible payment commitment" (CPC) According to their definition, a commitment to
repay is credible only if the government is able (not necessarily willing) to repay its debt
in every state of nature. This implies that the government cannot accumulate more debt
than the level it could service if it were to enter a fiscal crisis, defined as the case in
which the primary balance remains forever at its lowest possible value. Were the actual
level of debt to remain higher than the threshold determined by the CPC, then the
government would be facing a positive probability of default on its debt, something that
a risk-averse lender would not allow to happen.
With these considerations in mind, Mendoza and Oviedo (2003) developed a full-blown

Jl
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dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model \\'here the path of government revenues
is endogenously determined by the b~ha\'iour of utility-maximizing individuals and
profit-maximizing firms, in a context where both tradable and non-tradable goods are
produced. In their model, there 1s a mismatch in the government's balance sheet because
the go\'ernment debt is mostly denominated in tradable and tax revenues are mostly
denominated in non-tradable . They also assumed that volatility in government revenues
can be traced back to \·olatility in fundamentals such as the terms of trade, foreign
interest rates, or productivity.
There are se\·eral limitations that apply to the mdicators discussed above . First, they
mainly centred on soothing a particular debt-to-GDP ratio but are silent on the optimality
of this ratio . Secondly, all the indicators discussed so far are sufficient (but not
necessary) conditions for long-run sustainability. There are good reasons why a country
may want to run a large deficit Hence , it may be sub-optimal to prevent a country from
smoothing expenditure because this would lead to overshooting a fiscal ratio that
corresponds to a long-run equilibrium (Economist, 2002). Thirdly, these indicators
require assumptions on GDP growth, interest rate, go\·ernment expenditures and
revenues, and implicitly assume that these variables are exogenous. However, most of
these \·ariables ha\·e a tendency to be endogenous and correlated with one another. For
instance, it is clearly unrealistic to assume that changes in the primary deficit will have
no effect on interest rate and growth, or that changes in growth do not affect the primary
surplus.
Finally, most of these indicators do not take into account a host of factors that
characterize the situatio:1 in most developing countries but tend to draw almost
exclusively from the antecedents in the industrialised economies. For instcmce, most
developing economies, including the WAMZ countries have limited capacity to raise
taxes (because of a large informal sector), have volatile revenue base, are subject to
large external shocks (both real and financial) that increase the volatility of GDP growth
as well as debt service, and are characterized by limited access to world capital markets .
All of these elements complicate the management of fiscal policy and greatly increase
the difficulty of evaluating sustainability.

CBN FCC >N< >\!IC ,I.. 11:-S::\1':CL\I. RE\.Jl·\\·_ \"<>I.

-1:. :--;\ >

;

3:?

Ultimately, assessments of sustainability can be only probabilistic. An increase in public
sector debt is likely to increase the perceived risk of unsustainable public finances and
thereby the perceived risk of a future loosening of the monetary policy and ultimately of
monetary financing. The size of the perceived risk depends on many things such as the
level of government debt, the soundness of the fiscal policy framework as well as the
status of and the credibility of the monetary policy strategy adopted by the central bank
An increase in indebtedness gives rise to less concern if it is associated with strong and
credible overall policy framework and with strong commitments by the fiscal
authorities to restore the debt leYel to a low level within a realistic timetable On the
basis of these considerations, it has been argued that debt sustainability exercises should
be performed by making use of weighted debt-to-GDP ratios .
For fiscal policy to be sustainable, the aggregate level of spending must be consistent
with the macroeconomic framework. If not, high or rising budget deficits, depending
upon how they are financed, will result in particular macroeconomic imbalances. The
permissible aggregate level of spend mg depends upon the sustainable budget deficit and
the composition of that deficit. To calculate the sustainable deficit, future projections of
debt to GDP need to be made, given assumptions about the demand function of money,
the desired inflation rate, the real interest rate and the grov.,ih rate of the economy. The
deficit is unsustainable if the debt to GDP ratio is projected to grow in the future .

There is a close linkage between accumulation of external debt and domestic debt, as
economic agents borrow to fill the private savings-investment gap, the fiscal gap and/or
the foreign-exchange gap. Fedelino and Kudina (2003) in their alternative framework
for debt sustainability, take wto account external and domestic liabilities because, first,
while external debt may be sustainable, the total stock of debt may not be when
domestic debt is also included in total debt stocks, and second, to the extent that most
heavily indebted poor countries, like some of the WAMZ countries, do not have access
to international capital markets and rely on ODA flows, domestic financing has become
a significant source of funds with significant macroeconomic and debt sustainability
implications. Third, in a number of countries, past and current government's role in the
economy, for instance in the parastatals sector, has left a legacy of sizeable domestic

33

( Jnwioduokil

liabilities ( e:-:plicit and contmgent), these liabilities also impact on government ability to
sustain given fiscal policies. Thus, neglecting domestic debt might underestimate the
required magnitude of the fiscal effort needed to reach real debt sustainability. Even
though domestic debt is small compared to external debt, its influence on fiscal debt
sustainability could be great. For all the WAMZ countries between 2000 and 2003, the
stock of domestic public debt as a proportion of total public debt was quite high . The
fiscal burden of public domestic debt appears e\·en greater if interest payments are taken
into consideration . A substantial fraction of total interest payments by the WA MZ countries are on public domestic debt. Of all interest payments by The Gambia, for instance,
over 65.4 per cent is on domestic debt. The comparable figure for Nigeria is 22 .6 per
cent. Thu s, public domestic debt could prove a bottleneck for the WAMZ countries in
achieving fiscal sustainability, even if it were possible to reduce their external debt to
sustainable levels.
In order to provide for overall fisc al sustainability of the WAMZ countries, a country's
domestic public debt (and especially the amount of debt service on public domestic
debt) would be included in the debt sustainability analysis . Indeed, servicing domestic
debt adds as much, if not more, to a government's fiscal burden as servicing external
debt. To reduce the impact of fluctuations in yearly data, especially in respect of the
denominator of a debt ratio, it is usuall y preferred to use multi-year averages .
The HIPC Initiative for instance uses three-year backward-looking averages for exports
and revenues in calculatin g its NPV debt-to-export and NPV debt-to-revenue ratios .
Finally, given that each indicator has its limitations; it is also useful to look at more than
one or two debt indicators to determine a country's fiscal sustainability. It is important to
keep in view two principal purpose of fiscal sustainability: determining the sustainability
of a country 's external debt, and estimating the fiscal sustainability of a country 's public
debt' .
Gi\·en the peculiarities of the WAMZ economies, our analysis of the fiscal sustainability
shall adopt an eclectic approach . Unlike the principles applied in the HIPC Initiative,
debt and debt service 1s not limited to public and publicly guaranteed external debt, but
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include domestic debt The fiscal and debt sustainability of WAMZ countries 1s examined based on the following indicators, classified between solvency and liquidity indicators.
•

primary balance

•
•

total debt/GDP
total debt service /domestic revenue

•
•

total debt service/ Export
net present value of total debt /Domestic revenue

•

net present value of total debt service/Exports

III. Analysis of Fiscal Sustainability in the WAMZ
Based on the identified fiscal sustainability criteria outlined earlier, the analysis of the
WAMZ countries' fiscal sustainability is undertaken as follows:

Primary Balance
The primary balance measures how the current fiscal policy stance affects the net
indebtedness of the public sector. That is, since interest payments are the result of past
deficits, excluding them from the fiscal balance provides a clearer picture of Current
behaviour. The primary balance is therefore a useful indicator of sustainability of the
current fiscal stance of the government

1 When analvsing a country:~ external debt s11stainabilil'I: the debt cal<'fsOl'V should 11.malh· i11c/11de all ,•xfcmal dd,1.
whether it is public or prfrale {( a11a~1·sin[[ a countn· sjiKal s11s/ai11ahi/i1,: lh.: debt cate,;r,n· should 11s11all1· includt' all
public debt. both foreign and domestic. II 1s ge1wane tu also nole that IISlllfs a specific dehl rnriable 11s11al/1· also hc1s

implications for the use of 11111croeco11om1c dl.'110111i11alnr for a debt a11d a debt ser1·1ce ratio. For 111sta11ce, ir 1s
inappropriate to use tl,e exporr cle110111inator !f w,a~vsing a cn111rtry s totalfiscal debt st1slai11abili/\, 1rh1c-/1 include foreign
and domestic debt Simi/ar/1·. rlre use of tire 1·ev,·1111e deno111i11e1/or is 110/ appropriate ifa11a/1·si11g a co1111t1T :~ lotalforeig11
deb/ sustainabil1(r Indeed ,•xtanal debt s11sta11whilit1· is 1w1 a s1([ficie11t cu11d1l1emforfiscal s11.,1ai11abtf111 a11d !he re,·l'rse
holds true.
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Table I:
Country

Primary Balance (excluding grants) and Required Primary Surplus 2 as percentage of GDP.
Actual

Required

2000

2000

Actual
2001

Actual
2002

Required

Actual

Required

Actual

Required

2001

2002

2003

2003

2004

2004

Required

The Gambia

8 .8

9.4

- 4.7

9.8

• 4.2

8.2

-1.3

B.4

2.8

28.0

Ghana

0 .5

3.6

1.0

1.5

1.7

4.2

2.5

4 .6

1.1

10.8

Guinea

-3.4

5.8

- 3 .9

8 .9

- 4.6

2.8

- 5.8

-1.5

- 3.2

3.9

Nigeria

3.9

5.5

3 .3

0.5

- 1 .1

1.6

2.3

13.8

13 .3

7.4

-1 3 .5

36.5

-11 .1

10.0

- 10 .1

17.3

- 8.7

3.9

Sierra -Leone

- 89

15.4

In GDP terms, the government of The Gambia mainly recorded primary deficits, which
ranged between 4 .7 percent in ~001 and I .3 percent in 2003 . However, surpluses of 8.8
and 2.8 percent were also registered in 2000 and 2004. The fiscal performance of the
government using this indicator showed that although surpluses were registered in some
years, the levels were not enough to off set the outstanding obligations. For instance in
2000 the required level of surplus to attain sustainability was calculated to be 9.4 per
cent, while the required leYels for 200 I and 2002 were 9.8 and 8.2 per cent respectively.
The required surplus for 2003 and 2004 were 8.4 and 28 .0 per cent, respectively. Using
this basic indicator it is clear that fiscal policy was generally unsustainable in the Gambia
during the review period . In the last four years, Ghana's Primary balance was largely in
surplus ranging from 1.8 percent in 2000 and 2.1 percent in 2003 . On the average, the
rate hovered around 1.9 per cent during the review period . However, given the level of
interest required on both domestic and external debt, the surplus was clearly inadequate
to off set the needed debt service requirement as shown in Table l . In essence, the
government would have needed to drastically adjust its revenue and expenditure policy
in order to meet the debt service requirement. Thus, in assessing the fiscal sustainability
in Ghana, using this ratio clearly indicates that during the review period, fiscal policy
was clearly unsustainable. In Guinea, primary balance excluding grants deteriorated
from a deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP in 2000 to 5 .8 percent in '.2003 . Compared with the

1 The l"t't/1/Cred s urp/115 is deJin<'d as: s = (r-K) •dJ(l +g) . 1rh ere r is lh e real inl<'1·esl rate. K is the reul ( ,/JP gru1rth rate. and
dis the debt- G D/' ralin aT th e end of the y,•ar
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required primary surplus shown in Table I , it is obvious that the fiscal pol icy during the
period 2000-2004 was unsustainable. '.'Jiger-ia 's primary balance, which peaked at a
surplus of 4 percent of GDP in 2004 averaged 2.5 percent of GDP for 2000-2004.
Using this basic indicator, it is clear that Nigeria fiscal policy was sustainable in t\,·o
(2001 and 2004) out of the five years, when the actual were greater than the required. lt
is germane to note that the positiYe outcome was due to increased oil receipts accrued
from sustained high pnces and the fiscal restraint embraced of government. As a ratio of
GDP, the fiscal operations of the Sierra Lon<''s government generally resulted in primary
deficits, which varied between 13.5 percent in 2000 and 8.9 percent in 200..J. On account
of this indicator, the fi seal performance of the government demonstrated unsustai nab ii ity
in all of the period as shown by the magnitude of the divergence between the actual
primary balance and the required primary surplus.
In the Gambia, the ratio indicated a worsening trend since 2000 and was consistently
above l 50.0 percent between 2000 and 200..J.. The overall public debt -to-GDP ratio
increased from about I 57.3 percent in 2000 to 203 .4 percent in 2003, but declined to
I 51.3 percent in 2004.
Table II: Total Debt/ GDP ratio
(in percent).
Country

2000

2001

l

2003

2002

-

I

2004

The Gambia

157.3

150.7

179.0

203.4

151.3

Ghana

144.5

145.8

135.3

109.0

96.4

Guinea

165.2

182.0

172.0

169.3

157.3

Nigeria

83.5

80.9

90.7

77.8

68.8

215.1

177.9

164.7

112.8

Sierra-Leone

I

178

On the average, the ratio stood at 168.3 percent between 2000 and 2004. Regarding this
ratio, there has been a steady improvement in Ghana. From 144.5 and 145.8 percent in
2000, and 2001, respectively, the ratio declined gradually to 96.4 percent in 2004.Thus
the country operated within the threshold of 150 per cent considered sustainable level
during the review period An mdicator of Guinea's debt problems is the performance of
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the total debt to GDP ratio which is a key measure of a country's vulnerability. The ratio
rose from 165 .2 per cent in 2000 to I 82 0 per cent in 2001. It declined gradually from
172.0 per cent in 2002 to 1573 per cent in 2004 . The indicator on total debt to GDP
remained moderate in Nigeria during 2000-2004. The ratio, which stood at 83.5 per
cent of GDP in '.WOO rose to 90 7 per cent of GDP in 2002 before it dropped to 68.8 per
cent of GDP in 2004 . On the average , Total debt/GDP ratio during the period
2000-2004, was substantially below the unsustainability threshold of 150.0 per cent.
The ratio has improved significantly in Sierra Leone since 2000, due to large increased
grant from the donor community. Between 2000 and 2004 the ratio was consistently
above 150.0 per cent The overall public debt -to-GDP ratio dropped from about 215 .1
per cent in 2000 to 164. 7 per cent in 2002, but rose to 178 .0 per cent in 2004. The
average ratio for the period 2000-2004 was 181 . 7 per cent

Total Debt Service/Domestic Revenue
The performance of The Gambia on this indicator showed a worsening trend between
2000 and 2004. The ratio rose from 20.7 per cent in 2000 to 40.4 per cent in 2003,
indicating a 19.7 percentage point's growth rate over the period . However the ratio
moderated gradually to 32.8 per cent in 2004. The ratio of total debt service to domestic
revenue in Ghana indicated an improving trend between 2000 and 2004.
Table Ill: Total Debt Service I Domestic Revenue
(in percent)
2000

Country

I

2001

2002

2003

2004

The Gambia

20.7

26.5

32.0

40.4

32.B

Ghana

81.1

56.8

58 .2

45.1

35.2

Guinea

35 .2 1

33.4

38.8

53.1

47.5

Nigeria

16.4

14.7

21.7

26.5

10.6

48.7 1

57.4

63.3 I

71.8 I

56.1

Sierra-Leone

I

I

It improved gradually from 81 .1 per cent in 2000 to 35 .2 per cent in 2004 . On the average,
the ratio stood at 55 .3 per cent for the period Although the trend between 2000 and
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2004 showed significant improvement, it was substantially higher that the susta111able
threshold of 15.0 per cent The share of debt service in Guinea's total domestic revenue
has remained very high during 2000 to 2004, presenting soh·ency risks for the country.
The ratio dropped marginally from 3 5 2 per cent in 2000 to 3 3 .4 in 200 I . However a
deteriorating trend was registered in 2002 and 2003, with the ratio peaking at 531 per
cent in 2003 before gradual moderation to 47.5 per cent in 2004. In Nigeria, the
performance under this indicator followed a similar trend like in Gumea. The ratio
improved from 16.4 per cent in 2000 to 14. 7 per cent in 200 I, but worsened gradually to
26.5 per cent in 2003. Howe\·er, in 2004 the ratio impro\'ed significantly to 10 6 per cent
operating within the threshold of sustainabi Iity for the first time in the last fi vc years.
This indicator showed a deteriorating trend between 2000 and 2004 in Sierra Leone.
The ratio weakened from 48.7 per cent in 2000 to 71 8 per cent in 2003, but improved to
56.1 per cent in 2004. The analysis of the ratio indicate that except for Nigeria that
operated within the benchmark of I 5.0 per cent in just one year (200-l) none of the
WAMZ countries operated within the threshold during the review period indicating the
unsustainable level of the countries fiscal positions.

Total Debt Service/Export
The ratio of debt service to export for The Gambia worsened from 17. 7 per cent in 2000
to 18.5 per cent in 2002, but enhanced to 16.4 per cent in 2004. The average ratio for the
period was 17 .5 per cent, about 7. 5 percentage points above the threshold for debt
sustainability. The ratios in the last five years 2000- 2004 in Ghana generally mdicated
Table IV: Debt Service / Export
(in percent)
Country

2000

2001

~

2002

l

2003

2004

The Gambia

17.7

17.9 •

18.51

16.8

16.4

Ghana

23.8

12.1

18.2

17.9

13.4

Guinea

12.7

12.4

16.B

20.7

19.4

Nigeria

16.4

16.B

19.9

8.0

7.5

291.4

77.7

69.4

62.2

39.0

Sierra-Leone

I
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moderating trend . The ratio improved from 23 .8 per cent in 2000 to 12. l per cent in

2001, deteriorated to 18.2 per cent in 2002 and thereafter moderated to 13.4 per cent in
2004. In Guinea , during review period the ratio was consistently above the 10 per cent
benchmarks . It improved from 12 .7 per cent in 2000 to 12.4 per cent in 2001 but
deteriorated to 20.7 per cent in 2003 before easing marginally to 19.4 per cent in 2004.
The ratio of debt serYice to export deteriorated steadily from 16.4 percent in 2000 to
19.9 per cent in 2002 but improved to 7.5 per cent in 2004 in :\igeria The ratio of total
debt service to export in Sierra Leone improved from 291.4 percent in 2000 to 39.0 per
cent 111 2004. (Table IV). However, on the average the ratio was generally outside the
threshold for debt sustainability.
;\et Present value of Debt/ Domestic ReYenuc

The Net present value of debt as a ratio of domestic revenue for The Garn bia improved
progressively from 651 per cent in 2000 to 268.4 per cent in 2004 . On the average, the
ratio for the five year period, 2000-2004, stood at 516.3 per cent compared with
international benchmark of 250 per cent. For Ghana historical data on this measure of
sustainability reveal a high though declining trend between 2000 and 2004.The ratio
plummeted from 398 .8 per cent in 2000 to 113 .6 per cent in 2004. The average for the
five-year period stood at 233.4 per cent as against the sustainability threshold of 250 .0
per cent. The ratio of debt in present value terms to domestic revenue for Guinea stood
at 479.7 per cent at the end of 2000 relative to the benchmark of 250 .0 per cent. It
declined only slightly during the subsequent three years to stand at 304. 1 per cent in
2004, substantially above the threshold of sustainability.
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Table V: Net Present Value of Debt/ Domestic Revenue
(in percent)
Country

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

The Gambia

651.2

677.4

5583

426.2

268.4

Ghana

398.8

253.0

241.1

160.3

113.6

Guinea

479.7

423.8

372.6

337.4

304.1

Nigeria

192.8

164.6

212.2

142.7

92.4

Sierra-Leone

846.2

620.1

539.5

447.61

373.8

In Nigeria the ratio improved from 192. 8 per cent in 2000 to 164.6 per cent in 2001 but
worsened to 212.2 per cent in 2002 before improving to 92.4 per cent in 2004. The
present value of debt as a ratio of domestic revenue in Sierra Leone enhanced gradually
from 846.2 percent in 2000 to 373.8 per cent in 2004. The average ratio for the five-year
period, 2000-2004, stood at 565.4 per cent as against the international benchmark of250
per cent.

Net Present Value of Debt/Exports
The ratio of the present value of debt to export in The Gambia improved steadily from
493.0 per cent in 2000 to 191.7 per cent in 2004. On the average, the ratio was 298.6
percent over the period 2000-2005 compared with the threshold of 150 per cent In
Ghana, Present value of debt/Export ratio that peaked at 292. 7 per cent in 2000 declined
gradually to 158.4 per cent in 2004, representing an average level of 205.1 per cent
during the period compared to the threshold of 150.0 per cent. In net present value
terms, the ratio of debt to exports in Guinea, give a clear indication of the country's
heavy debt burden and solvency risk. During 2000 to 2004, the ratio has remained
consistently above the 150 per cent benchmark. The ratio improved from 230. 7 per cent
in 2000 to stand at an average of 179.1 per cent in 2001 but worsened marginally to
180.3 per cent in 2002 before moderating to 153.3 per cent in 2004. ln Nigeria the
present value of debt to export continued to be high during the assessment period. From
208.7 per cent in 2000 and 203.1 per cent in 2001, the present value of debt to export
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peaked at 216.0 per cent before it moderated to l 40.7 and l 22 .5 per cent in 2003 and
2004, respectiYely The performance a\·eraged 178 .2 per cent, exceeding the benchmark
of l 50 per cent. In Sierra Leone the ratio of the present value of debt to export was
astronomically high between the period 2000 and 2002, ranging from 4787 .6 per cent in
2000 and 1262 .6 per cent in 2002 . It improved substantially to 259.9 per cent in 2004 .
On the average the ratio for the period was 1783 .6 per cent, exhibiting a large variation
from the threshold of 150 percent.
Table VI: Net Present Value of Debt/Exports
(in percent)
Country

2000

2001

The Gambia

493.0

Ghana

2002

2003

2004

355.4

241.6

211 .2

191 .7

292.7

227 .4

188.8

158.4

158.4

Guinea

230.7

179.1

180.3

178.9

153.3

Nigeria

208.7

203.1

216 .0

140.7

122.5

4 ,787.6

2,220.4

1,262.6

387.6

259.9

Sierra-Leone

IV.

L

I

Factors Constraining Fiscal Sustainability in the WAMZ

The main causes of fiscal unsustainability which are peculiar to the developing
countries, including the WAMZ countries, are: terms of trade shock~weak revenue base ~
overdependence on foreign grants; excessive expenditure, etc.
External shocks, like terms of trade shock, tend to be larger in developing countries.
This affects the volatility of GDP growth and hence makes the growth rate difficult to
estimate. Given that all the WAMZ countries depend on one or at most two export
commodities, external shocks either in the price or quantity easily destabilize the fiscal
programme of government. Recent empirical findings including, Galindo and Izquierdo ,
(2003) present some ev idence that indicates that the impact of external shocks is
amplified by decline in capital flows in the developing countries. This is very instructive
as the combined impact of external shocks and decline in Foreign Direct Investment
inflow have complicated fiscal management in some WAMZ countries in the last two
years
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International Comparison of Average Fiscal Performance
2000. 2003
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Weak revenue base due principally to narrow revenue sources is another key characteristic of the WAMZ countries. The ratio of total tax re venue to the GDP measures the
relative depth of the revenue generating capacity of a country. In the WAMZ countries
the ratio was consistently below 20 per cent for all countries except The Gambia in
2000, Ghana in 2003 and Nigeria where the ratio for the period fluctuated between 40.6
per cent in 2000 and 3 5 .2 per cent in 2003. In the other \:VAMZ countries, the ratio
varied greatly from country to country and e ven between the years in the same country.
In The Gambia, the ratio ranged from 21.0 per cent in 2000 and 13 .8 per cent in 2003. In
Ghana, the ratio rose from 16.3 per cent in 2000 to 20.2 per cent in 2003. In Guinea, the
ratio increased from 9. 9 per cent in 2000 to l 0. 9 per cent in 2002 and thereafter fell to
9.8 per cent in 2003. The ratio was consistently above 29.0 per cent for all the review
period in Nigeria In Sierra Leone, the ratio rose from 10.8 per cent in 2000 to 12.0 per
cent in 200 I and thereGfter dropped gradually to 11.6 per cent in 2003. Most WAMZ
countries rely extensively on unsustainable and volatile revenue sources such as
external grants, and commodity and export taxes. The revenue sources are not also
diversified with some countries obtaining over 50 per cent of their tax reYenue from a
single source.
The cost of servicing debt constitutes a large claim on total government revenue, either
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because the domestic and external debt stock itself is large and/or because domestic real
interest rates are high. Problems associated with domestic and external debt are
therefore legitimate components of fiscal sustainability.
Debt Service I Total Revenue
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140.0
120.0
100.0 -
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0
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40.0 20.0 0.0 '
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Ghana
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Nigeria
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Country

The approach taken towards domestic debt reduction needs to reflect the nature of the
domestic debt burden in individual countries. Unlike the external debt burden, the size
and cost of the domestic debt burden varies greatly. The domestic debt stock of the
WAMZ countries is relatively low, both in absolute terms and compared to their external
debt burden. This is not universally the case: for some countries (such as Ethiopia and
Zimbabwe) domestic public debt is high so that even quite small changes in the real
interest rate on debt will require substantial fiscal accommodation. Even though the
debt stock itself is generally low, the cost of servicing domestic debt is often high,
reflecting the structure of domestic interest rates. To the extent that the required fiscal
accommodation is not forthcoming, increasing real interest rates can lead to a rapid
growth in the debt burden, regardless of the starting level, as the additional interest cost
is capitalized. Domestic debt is dominated by short-term instruments and is held
predominantly by financial institutions (the central bank and the commercial banks)

••

Since corporate debt and equity markets arc typically un<lerde\'elopcd , domestic public
debt frequently sencs 3s the only interest-bearing frnancial instrument in circulation
3nd therefore plays a central role in monetmy policy.

In contrast to external debt, the interest r3te on domestic debt is. at least partially,
determined by the outstanding stock of debt In particular, a high domestic debt stock
presents the authorities with an incentive to de\·alue the real debt stock by generating
inflation abo\'e the le\'el 3ntic1patcd by the pri\·ate sector. Gi\'en the narrowness of the
trnditional tax base in low income economics, the potential \'aluc of this "inflation tax"
revenue may be high . Anticipating this incentive, the pri\'ate sector will demand an
"inflation premium" on domestic debt, dri\'ing up interest rates The inflation tax
incentive (and hence the premium required to counter it) is positively related to the
stock of debt, hence reducing the stock of debt will, in 3ddition to lowering the cost of
debt service directly, lower the interest rate on debt Depending on the structure of the
domestic financial sector and the degree of capital account libernlization this may also
lower the cost of capital to the private sector and hence "crowd-in" higher le\'els of
domestic im·estment.
Whether declining domestic debt (and interest rates) will be passed on to the private
sector by way of cheaper or more credit depends on the structure of the banking sector.
Specifically, the less competitive is the banking sector ( or the less able it is to di\·ersify
its lending portfolio) the less the benefits of lower interest rates on debt will be passed
through to the private sector. In the WAMZ countries characterized by a history of
controls, and where the banking sector is typically oligopolistic, ··cro\vding-in" effects
may be relatively weak, at least in the short to medium term .

V.

Policy Recommendations/Conclusions

The foregoing analysis suggests the need for fiscal consolidation measures to address
the problem of sustainability In this regard. the reduction of the budget deficit v,:ould
constitute an important fiscal adjustment measure tov,:ards a more sustainable deficit
This need h3s already been recognized by the authorities, who intend to reduce the budget
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deficit o\·cr the medium term . Future primary surpluses would be required in order to
sen·icc (not entirely pay off) the prevailing debt in these countries. Increased tax
revenues and decreased government expenditure is another policy option . However,
increase in tax revenue would be difficult because of the inelastic nature of the tax base
in the \VAMZ countries. Nonetheless. towards this end , some go-vernments have taken
measures such as enhancing the tax base, impro\·ing ta.-;, administration and introducing
new taxes in recent years. The importance of these measures can not be overstated as it
is the only credible arrangement that can add to revenue .

It is pertinent for tax reforms in the WAYIZ to continue to focus on broadly-based taxes
such as Value Added Tax (VAT) . This is because, even at a lower tax rate, substantial
sums of money will continue to be generated from it. Because of this possibility, the
economic cost of these taxes tend to be lower, other things being equal , than those of
narrov,;ly-based taxes . Thus. the government should identify and incorporate additional
broadly-based taxes such as wealth taxes. Taxes on wealth. including property tax. which
is a selective tax on real estate; capital levy, which is a once-and-for-all tax on wealth;
and the domestic rate, which is a tax on the rental value of housing, are likely to yield
higher revenue for the government.
In most WAMZ countries only a few of the wealth taxes are imposed . The common ones
ha\·e been the property tax, capital gain tax and stamp duties . There are also serious
lapses in the collection of these taxes. The main problem with the wealth taxation is lack
of political will arising from the fact that those who formulate tax policies are part of the
wealth-owning class and political system is not sufficiently developed to compel a more
equitable distribution of wealth . The problem of valuation of property is also frequently
mentioned . A related area of reform is the taxation of luxury goods . High but not
prohibitive taxes could be imposed on certain categories of imported vehicles. houses
and other suspicious consumption items . This is without prejudice to the trade
liberalization programme of government. On a broader perspecti\·e both the taxable
capacity and poor economic structure can be improved by adopting strategies for growth
and development. Both aspects arc important for revenue mobilization The first aspect
is important for enhancing the tax base, and the second , for diversifying the sources of
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re\enue. It is recommended for instance, that attention should be focused on identification
and incorporation of more broadly-based taxes, such as wealth taxes, and on enh ancing
taxable capacity by adopting a viable development strategy.
Although the revenue could be increased through taxes, this framework is largely
limited in the \VAMZ because higher taxes may lessen private sector participation in
production activities. Therefore, the reduction of expenditure seems a preferred
alternative to be considered. The minimisation of wasteful expenditure, better targeting
of welfare programmes and reduction of transfers to corporations are important in the
current policy context. Other broader measures such as civil service reforms and public
enterprise reforms are also imperative.
In order to achieve fiscal stability and overall sustainability of government revenue,
fiscal policy design should aim at harnessing all direct and indirect tax revenue sources,
especially against the background of evidence that most WAMZ countries have not fully
exploited their taxable capacity. It is desirable that tax administration should be efficient,
apply simple and codified rules, ensure fairness, and embody progress. Tax administration
agencies need to be made functional through employment of qualified personnel, staff
training, provision of equipment and necessary facilities and overall conducive working
environment.
On the expenditure side, it is clear that public expenditure has the potential to contribute
significantly to economic growth and development This is particularly true for the \VAMZ
countries where the private sector is not yet very well equipped to take the initiatives
for growth and development and the government commands the greater part of national
resources However, for public expenditure to contribute meaningfully to growth and
development, it has to be prudently managed. Most WAMZ countries expenditure
management has not been quite impressive. The present economic crisis, with the
attendant problems of high inflationary pressures, exchange rate distortions, debt owr
hang, adverse balance of payments and high unemployment, to mention a few, has been
attn buted largely to reckless and poor management of public expenditure, coupled with
widespread corruption in the countries. It is on this note that the current efforts of

r
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gm ernmcnts across the zone in fighting corruption and other related malpractices should
be sustained There is need for government to ensure that the usual gap between policy
pronouncements and implement;ition is bridged . This among other things calls for good
go,·ernance as well as transparency and ~ccountability in the use of public resources_
GiYen the tension bet\veen the cost of domestic debt service and the role of the debt
instruments in the conduct of monetary policy, it is probably not optimal to seek to
eliminate domestic debt entirely R ather, the target for domestic debt should be a level
low enough to eliminate any excessi,·e inflation premium but not so low as to jeopardize
the smooth functioning of the monetary system . Gi\·en that the domestic debt stock is
already quite low in a number of \\'AMZ countnes, this target level may entail only
limited additional debt reduction . In such circumstances measures taken to reduce the
debt stock further without developing alternative interest bearing liquid assets (for
example Central Bank paper) may be destabilizing.
The interest rate-reducing effect of a lower debt stock operating through a reduced
inflation premium may be further enhanced if a lower domestic debt stock serves as a
more general signal of sustainable domestic macroeconomic policy in the future
Hov,:ever, transitional effects flowing from temporary real exchange rate movements
may offset or even reverse this effect in the medium term .
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